Why Taiwan’s Constitutional Court Hearing on Legislative Powers Matters to Global Security

When, on May 20, Cho Jung-tai finally took his post as Premier of Taiwan, the veteran lawmaker was eager to start enacting an ambitious legislative agenda—including combating online fraud, raising the minimum wage, and green-lighting some 140 infrastructure projects.

But just over a week later the island’s legislature passed amendments that enhanced its scrutiny powers over the government to a level that critics deemed a brazen attempt to hobble the new administration of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Lai Ching-te. Under the new powers, the legislature—control of which the DPP lost to the combined opposition Nationalists (KMT) and Taiwan Progressive Party (TPP) in January’s general election—has more power to control government budgets and investigate state projects, including the right to require the military, private companies, or individuals to disclose information deemed relevant to parliamentary investigations.

Government officials could also be fined or even jailed by lawmakers for “contempt of parliament” if they decline to answer questions or provide testimony deemed inaccurate. In addition, the reforms obligate the President to deliver an annual report and immediately answer questions from lawmakers. “When ministers go to the Legislative Yuan, they are working professionally,” Cho told TIME in late May. “So they should have freedom of speech, and they should not be threatened by the criminal code.”

The scrutiny amendments have already caused a bitter schism in Taiwan society. Early readings of the bills caused a riot in the legislature, with rival lawmakers trading insults and punches and one DPP member stealing the actual paper bill and absconding from the chamber like an NFL running back in order to stymie its progress. When the bill was eventually passed, on May 28, DPP lawmakers hurled garbage bags at their opposition peers.

Matters come to a head next week after three government agencies raised objections to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, whose 15 justices were all appointed during the previous DPP administration though has historically proven a non-partisan arbiter. The bench announced it will hear arguments on Tuesday on the legality of the amendments with a decision expected within three months. “First of all, we think that these bills are unconstitutional,” says Cho. “Secondly, we think they will increase coNFLict between governmental agencies. Thirdly, we think they infringe upon the rights of the people. And fourthly, we think that it is a misuse of the criminal code.”

Much of Taiwan’s public agrees, and thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the legislature in May to protest the bill’s passing. Among their complaints was that the enhanced scrutiny powers would aid the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has been plain regarding its intention to annex self-ruling Taiwan, which broke from the mainland in 1949 following China’s civil war but which strongman Xi Jinping still believes is a renegade province to be brought back into the fold. Demonstrators brandished placards such as “The Evil Empire of Xi Jinping” and “Reject Black Box Reform!”

Some DPP lawmakers have even accused their KMT peers of being a fifth column for the People’s Republic (PRC), pointing to how 17 KMT lawmakers traveled to Beijing in late April and met with CCP No. 4 and chief ideologue Wang Huning. While conceding that “this is a worry among the Taiwanese people and DPP legislators,” Cho personally is “more cautious,” he says. “I think that relations between the executive branch and the legislative branch is a domestic matter, and we should resolve it inside our own country.”

The KMT steadfastly denies that it is working on behalf of Beijing and insists it simply wants to restore checks and balances that have eroded through reforms over the three decades since democratization. “The legislative power is intended to serve as a check on the executive power,” Alexander Huang, director of international affairs for the KMT, tells TIME. However, “the President almost always controls their political party, reducing hurdles to total control over all branches of the government to near zero.”

It’s certainly true that Taiwan’s multi-branch semi-presidential political system has become more presidential in recent years. Despite the crowds gathered to protest the scrutiny amendments, one poll suggests that 57% of respondents supported enhanced legislative checks. And there’s some merit to opposition complaints that recent DPP administrations have been able to pass even controversial legislation with only cursory scrutiny.

Following the amendments, however, the situation is practically reversed, with the government’s power to enact legislation severely curtailed and the opposition oddly empowered. In recent months, several KMT and TPP-sponsored bills—such as billions of dollars for development projects in the island’s east and hikes to the government-set price of rice purchases—have advanced through the legislature with very little debate. “This is totally undemocratic and also unscientific,” says Chen Fang-yu, an assistant professor of political Science at Soochow University in Taipei. “There’s no review at all so people are very worried.”

It’s especially concerning against the backdrop of mounting Chinese pressure since Lai took office. In response to Lai’s inauguration speech, Beijing held two days of “punishment” military exercises around Taiwan and has waged “gray zone” warfare, including dispatching balloons over the island and almost daily air force and naval sorties nearby.

Indeed, while accusations of overt CCP iNFLuence in the scrutiny amendment are “fanciful,” says Jonathan Sullivan, director of China programs at the Asia Research Institute of Nottingham University in the U.K., he notes “there are potential scenarios that could play out to China's benefit.” For one, a small cohort of pro-China legislators could launch damaging investigations against perceived opponents of the PRC. “One can imagine scenarios where this could be quite serious indeed.”

Not least as several recent opposition proposals directly relate to defense matters, including one to transfer Taiwan’s National Security Council from the President’s Office into the executive branch, where lawmakers would have greater powers over budgets, staffing, and operations. The TPP is also proposing to reduce the threshold for any negotiated agreement between Taipei and Beijing, which at present requires three-quarters of lawmakers and a national referendum to pass. “I think both will be main goals of the next session of the Legislative Yuan,” says Chen.

But it’s not just legislation with overt national security implications that might prove vital to the security of Taiwan—and, by extension, the wider world given the island’s pivotal role in global supply chains and the potential for the U.S. to get drawn into any coNFLict. In an interview with Bloomberg Businessweek published last month, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump accused Taiwan of stealing “100% of our chip Business” and said that the island “should pay us for defense.”

The famously transactional former and potential future President’s words caused a flurry of anxiety in Taipei, where Cho told reporters that Taiwan was “willing to take on more responsibility” regarding security in the Taiwan Strait and wider Indo-Pacific region. “Of course, in terms of procuring equipment and weapon systems we need support from like-minded countries around the world including the United States,” Cho tells TIME. In fact, Taiwan is currently awaiting delivery of a backlog worth about $19 billion of arms from the U.S.—deliveries delayed due to the prioritization of weapons for war-ravaged Ukraine—and last year extended mandatory conscription from four months to one year for all male citizens.

Yet the potential for a new Trump Administration following November’s presidential election to make backing for the island contingent on preferential trade or investment relations has rendered Cho’s ability to pass legislation far from simply a domestic concern. Last month, he unveiled a sweeping economic and social reform plan aimed at bringing in nearly $100 billion in investment—though much may hinge on which way the Constitutional Court decides to go.

In the meantime, Cho has reached across the aisle and suggested all parties concentrate on passing less contentious legislation, such as stiffer penalties for fraudsters, ocean conservation, and road safety. “Fraud is a huge issue here and people are fed up with it,” he says. Needless to say, government paralysis can invoke similar feelings.